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The Navy has to choose the number of, and designs for, ships in the Combat 
Logistics Force (CLF), and then plan how to use them to provide logistical support to our 
Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups, and Seabasing platforms engaged in 
any variety of worldwide conflicts.  CLF ships are very expensive to build and equip and 
our budget is limited --- we need to make sure the ships we buy and the way we integrate 
these with our CLF fleet can continue to provide the flexible support our Navy requires.  
We introduce a decision support tool using a global sea route and resupply base model, 
and a daily time resolution optimization of CLF ship activities to support any complete, 
worldwide scenario.  Our result is an optimal, face-valid daily operational logistics plan – 
a schedule of evolutions for each available CLF ship.  We discover exactly how to use 
CLF ships to support a notional, but particularly relevant, preemptive combat scenario 
with follow-on humanitarian assistance missions.  Finally, we study how changing CLF 
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The U.S. Navy’s ability to react to a multitude of missions in a short period of 
time is one of its great strengths.  Logistically supporting this flexibility is expensive.  
Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships, are tasked with the underway replenishment of 
combatant forces;  this capability allows for the continuous and quick deployment of 
forces for a sustained period of time. 
CLF assets are expensive to purchase and maintain.  With a price tag of up to $1.2 
billion for the new multi-commodity CLF ships determining an appropriate future CLF 
structure is critical for the execution of the various U.S. Navy missions.   
There are many tools available to analyze the CLF. Most are either stochastic 
simulations or average consumption-rate models.  Descriptive models, such as 
simulation, do not allow us to discover the full potential of the force, and steady-state 
analyses can easily miss critical details, such as constraints on scheduling, that can 
significantly impact performance. We use an optimization model, similar to one 
developed by Borden [2001] and further refined by Givens [2002] and Cardillo [2004] 
for their analyses of CLF levels that prescribe a near-optimal schedule for shuttle ship 
consolidations (CONSOLs) supporting a regional combat operation followed by a follow-
on humanitarian aid effort. 
Our model provides daily fidelity, prescribes CONSOL amounts of each of four 
commodities (aviation fuel, diesel fuel, ammunition, and stores) by shuttle ship, afloat 
group, and day. We develop an unclassified, 60-day notional scenario to establish the 
necessary amount of T-AKE auxiliary cargo-and-ammunition ships, T-AO fleet oilers, 
and T-AOE(X) multi-commodity ships that can sustain the force. Each of the six afloat 
groups in our scenario steams independently to an operating area and, on a given day, 
they combine to form a Sea Base. Each afloat group is also represented by a daily 
position during its respective transit, presence, and combat phases of deployment. We use 
logistic planning factors approved by OPNAV N42 for the burn, consumption and 
expenditure rates, and capacities of the individual naval ships.  We track inventory levels 
each day for each commodity (i.e., ship and aviation fuels, stores, and ordnance). Each 
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afloat group is located daily along with its consumptions for the 60-day excursion. Daily 
stock levels for four commodities are tracked with penalties for running below safety 
stock levels.  
We formulate our model to maintain safety stock levels, and to encourage early 
delivery of as much of each commodity as possible.  Since all commodity amounts vary 
from consolidation to consolidation, the best amount of each product to load and deliver 
is chosen to top off the station ship and its CSG combatants or afloat group, or to deliver 
as much as possible. The model endeavors to deliver exactly what each afloat group 
consumes during the entire 60-day hypothetical scenario.  
The stationary Sea Base is formed from three Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), two 
Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs), and one (MPG).  We optimize the logistical support 
of forces transiting to the area of operations, as well as the actual Sea Base after its 
formation. 
We conclude that 3 T-AKE and 4 T-AO ships will be required to support our 
notional 60-day scenario.  We find that fuel drives the scenario during the deployment 
phase of the operation:  All the ships expend fuel at a faster rate while transiting to the 
area of operations at best possible speed.  We observe that stores (i.e., food and medical 
supplies) drives demand the last twenty days during the humanitarian aid effort.  If we 
allow the reserve levels to increase to 60 percent, the number of required CLF ships 
increases to 3 T-AKE and 4 T-AO ships.  If we use a single fuel to replace both aviation 
and diesel fuel, the CLF ship requirement drops to 3 T-AKE and 3 T-AO ships.  If we use 
T-AOE(X) ships as shuttle ships instead of station ships our CLF ship requirement is       






I. INTRODUCTION  
Modern naval forces require logistical support at sea to remain effective for long 
periods of time.  The Military Sealift Command (MSC) operates the Combat Logistics 
Force (CLF) to fulfill this role.  CLF ships carry large inventories of fuel, ordnance, food 
and other supplies from ports to customer ships.  The ability to transfer these stores while 
underway enables naval forces to operate at sea virtually indefinitely.  MSC 
accomplishes this by using shuttle ships to transfer materiel from ports to ships at sea, 
while station ships resupply within the Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs).  CLF ships are 
either single or multi-commodity ships, and each class of ship has different transit speeds.  
The CLF gives the U.S. naval forces additional sustainability by acting as an extension of 
the combatant ship’s bunkers, magazines, and storerooms. 
The CLF competes with many other Navy and DoD acquisition programs for 
funding.  The new classes of CLF ships are not cheap.  Each T-AOE(X) (the future multi-
commodity ship) is estimated to cost $1.2 Billion and each T-AKE (two-commodity ship) 
costs approximately $420 Million in FY09 dollars.  The ten-year outlook for acquisition 
funding is limited as DoD resources are directed toward retooling the military to become 
lighter and more responsive to the threats in the Global War on Terrorism.   
Currently the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Navy Strategic Mobility and 
Combat Logistics (OPNAV N42) relies on many agencies using different tools to provide 
CLF analysis. Various products from other sources use either descriptive theater-level 
operating-area simulations or spreadsheet-based average cycle time resupply models.  We 
become concerned when “average model” results are applied with confidence to combat 
scenarios that have highly-variable and geographically-dispersed demands for fuels, 
ordnance, and stores.  These models are not capable of addressing a majority of OPNAV 
N42 questions, especially those concerned with feasible, efficient use of CLF assets in 
demanding scenarios. 
We have developed an integer programming model of CLF sustainment of strike 
groups in almost any user-defined scenario.  Given daily positions and consumption of 
each of four commodities (diesel fuel, aviation fuel, stores, and ammunition) for every 
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afloat group in the scenario, our model prescribes the loading, movement, and 
replenishments of CLF shuttle ships with daily time resolution to maintain sufficient 
inventories of all four products for each afloat group in the model.  See [Borden, 2001], 
[Givens 2002], [Cardillo, 2004] for the development and evolution of the model. 
We analyze a demanding 60-day scenario involving an intense preemptive combat 
operation immediately followed by a humanitarian assistance support mission.  Our 
results provide an optimal CLF configuration to meet these Navy future requirements and 
suggest important alternatives for effectively employing these ships.   
We have used planning factors and concepts of operations (CONOPS) provided 
by experts at OPNAV N42, and they can use our results to gain a better understanding of 
the size and configuration of the CLF required for future logistical support.  
A. BACKGROUND 
1. The Current CLF Plan 
The CLF is the foundation for naval operational logistic support of forces afloat.  
Recapitalizing the CLF fleet for meeting its future commitments is an important and 
difficult problem because funding is limited.   
Tentatively scheduled for completion by FY15, this last phase of building CLF 
infrastructure is critical and will determine the future logistical capabilities for supporting 
the Navy of tomorrow as shown in Figure 1.  The planned recapitalized CLF will consist 
of four classes of ships; T-AO 187 (fleet oilers), T-AOE 6 (fast multi-commodity support 
ships), T-AOE(X) (fast multi-commodity support ships future), and T-AKE (ammunition 
and stores).  Their cargo capacities for the four basic commodities we consider and their 
speeds are summarized in Table 1. 










T-AKE 0 0 3,971 1,916 17 
T-AO 109,000 65,400 0 0 16 
T-AOE or (X) 120,000 61,200 1,111 2,593 27 
 
Table 1. CLF Ship Capacities and Speeds [Futcher, 2004] 
 
AGING FLEET                                                  RECAPITALIZED FLEET  
    34 Ships                                                                                                                  33 Ships  
                                                          
  (6 Classes)                                                                                                              (4 Classes)  
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  Figure 1. Current CLF Transition Plan.   
 
The current vision of the future Combat Logistics Force Composition.  Future CLF ship 
numbers provided by OPNAV N42. [derived from Lamboni, 2002] 
 
Two questions that continue to be prominent in each budgeting cycle are: 1) how 
much CLF do we need, and 2) what design types are ideal and economical for meeting 
our future military requirements?  These questions strike at the heart of planning.  The 
CNO’s surge plan stresses speed and the ability to reconfigure to the mission while 
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closing to the objective.  As an example, the former Amphibious Readiness Group 
(ARG) has been expanded into the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) with the addition 
of combatants, and now warrants further examination for CLF support.  Lastly, the 
concept of operations for seabasing is under development and brings the question of 
logistical support for the multitude of ships and units making up the sea base into the 
foreground. 
2. Concerns about Current Planning 
A number of analysis of alternatives efforts and other CLF studies have produced 
this vision for the future CLF.  The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), the fleet, and the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) are examining if the CLF is sized to meet wartime and 
peacetime presence requirements based on recent strategic planning guidance and Navy 
fleet response plans.  The required number of T-AOE(X) and T-AKE ships continues to 
be the central issue.  A CLF force of 32 ships by the year 2015 is considered by some to 
be excessive.  Major studies in progress, such as the logistics concept of operations for 
seabasing, may not only justify this CLF fleet size, but possibly point out a need for 
more.  
B. OBJECTIVES  
The objective of this thesis is to size the CLF appropriately for any given 
scenario.  The fictional scenario we provide determines the minimum number of CLF 
ships necessary to sustain multiple strike and maritime prepositioning groups (MPGs) 
deployed worldwide transitioning from a peacetime to wartime posture and then 
continuing to support follow-on humanitarian assistance operations.  We are seeking to 
identify any redundancy in the CLF fleet or clearly indicate any shortfalls in logistical 











II. A MODEL OF COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE EMPLOYMENT 
A. WHY CHOOSE AN OPTIMIZATION MODEL? 
We prefer a prescriptive optimization model because we are interested in 
discovering the most effective, feasible way to employ CLF ships, which may not always 
be obvious when other analysis tools are used.   
CNA used a steady-state analysis (or “average model”) in its analysis of 
alternatives and statistical presence ratios for the time period between Operation 
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom [CNA, 2003] to determine future CLF 
levels for the Navy’s fleet response plan of six and eight CSGs.  Their models ignore 
geographical and temporal operations and therefore overestimate the efficiency of the 
CLF in their scenarios. 
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) used a simulation model 
for its recent CLF analysis [CINCLANTFLT, 2001].  Simulation is also an option, 
perhaps an overused one for CLF modeling, but descriptive simulation models require 
that we suggest alternatives to evaluate.  Descriptive simulation models are often 
developed with specific operational plans or policies in mind, which can introduce certain 
biases and may distort the analysis in undesirable ways.  While simulation is easier to 
implement, and admits stochastic variation of parameters, we see little to recommend 
introducing randomness until we ensure that our deterministic scenario and the planning 
factors used appear reasonable, determine what the core CLF fleet size should be, and 
specify where and how it should be used.   
Our optimization model provides analyses independent from previous major CLF 
studies.  No other organization is currently using optimization to look at future CLF fleet 
structure.  No other organization is currently looking at the specific CLF support required 
for seabasing, from deploying from various ports and locations to forming the Sea Base 
and resupplying it.  We seek insight, not complexity, and although mathematical 
optimization, by its nature, requires more mathematics than simulation, its power appeals 
here.      
6 
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND NOTATION 
Throughout this document we refer to each Carrier Strike Group (CSG), 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), and Maritime Prepositioned Group (MPG) as simply 
a group.  A group is completely defined by the ships (both combatants and CLF station 
ships) that it comprises. 
Our model is primarily influenced by the assumption that daily time resolution is 
adequate for a 60-day notional scenario and for all CLF movement and CONSOL 
scheduling.  Finer resolution would add extra layers of complexity, straining our ability 
to generate credible consumption data, and coarser resolution would obscure too many 
essential details.
We assume deterministic, preplanned group movements, and deterministic CLF 
ship movements.  All CLF movement is based on the standard formula: distance equals 
speed multiplied by time.   
We assume each shuttle ship executes only one CONSOL before proceeding back 
to port to replenish.  Although at first this assumption may appear unrealistic, we find the 
shuttle ship utilization to be above 80% for the majority of the CONSOL events in the 
time horizon of our scenario.  This indicates the shuttle ships will not have enough stores 
to provide an adequate second CONSOL, and therefore will almost always return to port 
to prepare for a fully-loaded CONSOL event.  The few cases where shuttle ship 
utilization is below 80% are all due to “topping off” CONSOLs en route to the theater.  
No other afloat group is in range for the CLF ship to perform a second CONSOL in each 
of these situations.  This assumption is a restriction to our model, but it does not seem to 
make a difference.  These operationally conservative planning assumptions reduce the 
theoretical CLF capability, but adhere to textbook practices for operating CLF station and 
shuttle ships. [Miller, 1992]   
We assume that each ship in the afloat groups enters our scenario loaded with 
100% of all commodities, and that each CLF shuttle ship can be optimally pre-positioned 
for its first consolidation visit to a strike group or MPG.
We assume that each aggregate commodity (e.g., “stores”) in our model 
represents loads that fill demand exactly for all of the individual commodities (e.g., 
7 
razors, food, toilet paper) it represents.  This is especially important when considering 
different types of ammunition; the resolution of the model does not allow tracking of 
individual munitions types.   
We assume that reloading a CLF shuttle ship requires two days, regardless of 
where or what we load.  Borden [2001] and Givens [2002] use the very conservative 
estimate of three days.  We consider two days a conservative estimate that accounts for 
potential backlog of commodities and ships at advance bases, “fog of war” delays, and a 
maximum reload event: a full ordnance load onto a T-AKE and a full resupply of stores.  
The current average reload time spent in port by a forward-deployed CLF shuttle ship 
supporting combat operations is between one and two days [Morgan, 2003].  We also 
assume that all in-port replenishment for the shuttle ships is 100%.  All commodities 
required to replenish the shuttle ship completely are always present in the port. 
We represent each group as single entity, viewed as an aggregate customer 
representing the individual ships that compose it.  We assume that the groups in our 
scenario can aggregate smoothly into a larger single Sea Base entity.  This preserves 
visibility of their logistic state, and ensures that our CONSOL visits deliver quantities 
that the afloat groups can receive.   
The commodity capacity and consumption rates of each afloat group are based on 
the total capacities and consumption of all constituent platforms.  Because of that, some 
fidelity is lost.  But, the differences in the stock levels between individual platforms in a 
group tend to remain small.  Although some additional fidelity is lost in assuming a 
single CONSOL visit to an individual group, we also assume that the shuttle ships will 
replenish the correct commodities with the appropriate ships of that group requiring 
resupply.  These underway replenishments will occur on the same day, which implies in 
CLF language that “service station” (vice “delivery boy”) ship UNREPs will be required 
for all of these underway replenishment events. [Miller, 1992]   
The only groups that are represented without a station ship are those that will 
always be replenished directly by a shuttle ship, and never expend or require ordnance for 
our modeling purposes.  This assumption is consistent with planning factor guidance 
provided by OPNAV N42. [Futcher, 2004] 
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Lastly, we assume that the CLF and combatant ships are virtually invincible 
during our hypothetical scenario.  Our ships do not sink, take themselves out of service, 
or limit their combat or resupply capability because of enemy damage or engineering 
failures during the 60-day scenario.  Our Navy’s recent history on the high seas during 
combat has been that we seize and maintain naval superiority quickly, defend our naval 
forces quite well, and lose relatively little underway time during deployments due to 
maintenance failures.  The expected capabilities of the opponent in this notional scenario 
to inflict damage directly on our naval forces are also assumed to be minimal. 
C. MODEL MODIFICATION 
We require the modeling of support for both transiting ship groups and the 
aggregated Sea Base.  Our requirement leads us to modify model of Cardillo [2004] to 
include a mechanism that allows all ships from specified groups on a given day to merge 
to form the Sea Base.  The Sea Base first appears on day 17 in our scenario, and 
represents the total capacities and the sum of current commodity levels of all groups of 
ships it comprises.  We cannot treat every group individually at this point due to the 
reduction in utilization of the shuttle ships that would ensue.  Aggregation of the Sea 
Base allows our model to effectively utilize CLF capacity and therefore properly 














Table 2. Number of ships, by type, in the Sea Base 
 
We modify the model to combine all capacity levels and current commodity 
levels from day 16 and assign the sums to the Sea Base on day 17.  The Sea Base is made 
up of 3 CSGs, 2 ESGs and one MPG, with the breakdown by ship type shown in Table 2.  
Our aggregation of these ships’ capacities and inventories allows more realistic 
utilization of CLF ships with the model assumption of only one CONSOL before 
resupply. 
The models in Givens [2002] and Cardillo [2004] use an objective function (10) 
that penalizes inventory shortfalls and rewards CONSOLs.  We modify the objective 
function to encourage the model to CONSOL the maximum amount of inventory to the 
forces earlier in the scenario. (See Appendix 1 for a full explanation of the model used 
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and days  is defined as the number of days in the scenario. The new objective 
function (10’) consists of three terms.  The first rewards CONSOLs by volume and day, 
where the base reward on the first day of the scenario is equal to the penalty, by 
commodity, for falling below safety stock levels (penaltyc), and this reward decreases 
with each successive day until the reward for a CONSOL on the last day is zero, 
regardless of its volume.  This is the key difference between our objective and (10), 
which did not place a premium on earlier deliveries.  The second term captures the 
penalties for falling below safety stock levels, by volume.  The final term is similar to the 
second, except that the unit volume penalty (negpen) for falling below zero inventory is 
much larger than any of the other penalties, to encourage the model to maintain feasible 
inventories. 
D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
We want to estimate the fewest number of shuttle ships that is able to sustain the 
deployed battle force with fuel, stores, and ordnance in our notional scenario.  In our 
scenario, we want to minimize the amount of and the duration of shortfalls below afloat 
group safety stocks.  
If we are able to keep all inventories above safety sock levels, then we prefer to 
maximize the volumes of commodities delivered to the CSG’s station ship and the ESG 
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and MPG entities, thereby “topping them off” whenever possible.  We want to maximize 
the number of days separating CONSOLs.  When we plan a consolidation visit by T-
AKE and/or T-AO shuttle ships, we want the visit to be worthwhile.  I.e., we want to 
make as few visits as possible, and make the most of each visit.  
The stationary Sea Base in our scenario forces us to look for new methods of 
measuring optimality.  Past theses using this model have considered feasibility the 
determining factor for calculating appropriate CLF level.  Namely, whether the CLF ship 
can CONSOL with the group is determined by the relative speed of both entities.  This 
was an appropriate measure since the scenarios were supporting only transiting CSGs or 
ESGs.  These models struggle to find feasible sequences of CONSOLs due to these 
limitations.  In contrast, the Sea Base is stationary.  Feasibility is not an issue, but 
efficiency and safety stock levels are. 
For this seabasing scenario, we measure the utilization of each CONSOL by 
taking the volume of each commodity transferred and dividing it by the total capacity for 
that commodity on the CLF ship delivering it.  We would like to keep this ratio as high as 
possible because each CLF ship can only CONSOL once before returning to port to 
resupply.  A CONSOL of zero to fifty percent is considered poor utilization, and we 
color-code this event red (dark in grayscale) in our tabular displays.  Likewise, fifty one 
to seventy five percent is considered marginal and colored yellow (gray in grayscale), and 
seventy six to one hundred percent is considered good utilization and is color-coded 
green (light in grayscale). 
As an example, Table 3 presents the utilization data for all shuttle ships in our 
base scenario.  We see each CONSOL represented as a line in the table, where, reading 
across, we see the shuttle ship, the day on which the CONSOL occurrs, the location 
(latitude and longitude) of the CONSOL, and the percent of total commodity capacity 
transferred to the customer ship.  Clearly, as we add CLF ships, the utilization numbers 
will drop for each individual CLF ship. 
  
Table 3. Example of Shuttle Ship Utilization Data 
 
For instance, the ship labeled ‘take03’ makes three CONSOLs, one on day 07, one on day 
16, and one on day 28.  On day 07, it is at latitude -06.10, longitude +063.95, and 
transfers 22% of its DFM and 1% of its JP5.  This is a very low utilization CONSOL.  
Red (dark) cells represent CONSOLs of no more than 50 percent shuttle ship capacity.  
Yellow (gray) cells represent larger CONSOLs no more than 75 percent. Green (light) 
cells show CONSOLs larger than 75 percent. 
 
Next we look at the commodity inventory levels for the customer ships.  Our goal 
here is to keep inventory levels above reserve levels.  The most desirable situation is 
when all inventories remain above reserve levels, and exhibit no long-term downward 
trends.  We refer to this as an “even trend”.  Figure 2 illustrates even trend inventories for 
the Sea Base.  Reducing the number of CLF ships will negatively impact inventory 





































































Figure 2. Example of “even trend” Commodity Levels for the Sea Base 
 
For instance, we observe an “even trend” for F-76 (DFM), F-44 (JP-5), and Class 5 
(Ammunition).  We observe a “decreasing trend” for Class 1 (Stores)  
 
The final step is to consider both indicators together, as summarized in Figure 3.  
If the utilization is high (green) and the commodity levels exhibit an even trend, then the 
number of CLF ships is nearly optimal, in the sense that adding CLF ships would just 
lower the utilization of all CLF ships, and removing CLF ships would introduce a 
decreasing trend in some inventory levels.  If the utilization is red and the commodity 
level trend is even then the number of CLF ships is too high.  If the utilization is green 
and the commodity level trend is decreasing then the number of CLF ships is insufficient 
to maintain commodity levels above the reserve amount.  This last option is not a real 
possibility.  In this case, the “wasted” capacity could be re-tasked to produce higher 
inventories.  Even if the utilization started out red, it would become green as the CLF 
ships deliver large quantities of material to make up the shortages. 
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Figure 3. CLF performance matrix used to determine desirable CLF ship levels 
 
E. NAVIGABLE SEA-ROUTE NETWORK 
Our CLF shuttle ships (T-AKEs and T-AOs) can navigate in the tracks of the 
afloat groups.  They can also part company with a customer group at any time, sail to a 
port, reload, and depart for the next required CONSOL or multiple- underway 
replenishment event.  Because each CONSOL’s day and location are outputs of our 
model, rather than inputs, we require a model of all navigable world sea routes, to support 
the possible CLF movements.  Figure 4 is a display of the node locations and regional 
node-to-node arcs that represent our simple world sea-routes network.  This is a 
navigable, connected network model that allows shuttle ships to sail on all the major sea 
routes in the world.  The model can easily be adapted for operations concentrated in other 
parts of the world, and is easily extended to allow for higher resolution.  This model has 
been refined and improved throughout the evolution of our optimization research. 
We define a set of nodes worldwide; each node is either an at-sea waypoint or a 
port at which we can reload our shuttle ships.  Waypoints include the Strait of Gibraltar, 
Indian Ocean, etc., and ports include San Diego, Augusta Bay, Sasebo, etc. (see Figure 
4).  Our sea-route model includes, by implication, a node for each daily position of each 
group track in our scenario.  We identify adjacent node pairs in order to navigate between 














































Figure 4. World Sea Routes Nodes and Arcs 
A simple world network depicts minimum node locations required for transit in 
the open sea (waypoints), reloading at ports, and establishing operational areas in major 
world regions of interest.  The network is composed of 83 nodes, 156 fast arcs, 10 slow 
arcs, and 24 ports; details are provided in Appendixes B and C.  The network is 
constructed in three phases.  First, a node is defined at each port and at a number of at-sea 
waypoints frequently used by ships navigating worldwide.  A “fast arc” connects each 
pair of these nodes between which full-speed transit is feasible.  A “slow arc” connects 
some node pairs (e.g., canal entrances) with a fixed transit time.  Next, any group’s daily 
position not collocated with one already in the network is added, with an arc connecting 
each of these successive daily positions.  Finally, wherever a fast arc and/or group’s track 
arc intersect some other such arc, we induce a waypoint, and add neighboring arcs.  The 
result is a worldwide network that our shuttle ships use while moving between advance 
bases and the scenario’s afloat groups.   
The time required to transit between any adjacent pair of nodes is mathematically 
determined by speed and great-circle distance, except for a few distinguished “slow arcs” 
for which a fixed transit time is provided manually.  Slow arcs include, for instance, the 
Suez Canal and the Malaccan Strait.  (See Appendix C, Table 2 for a complete list of 
slow transit arcs.) 
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Given this network of nodes and adjacent arcs, with transit times for each, we 
solve for the shortest paths between all pairs of nodes using the Floyd-Warshall 
algorithm. (see Ahuja, et. al. [1993], p.144).  Surprisingly, we require relatively few 
nodes to represent the transit from Norfolk, via the Mediterranean and Red Seas, to the 
North Arabian Sea.  If needed, our sea route model also expresses operational restrictions 
at each node.  For example, CONSOLs are precluded in canals and other restricted 
passages, such as in the Malaccan Strait or Suez Canal.   
The result is a navigable, connected (i.e., we can navigate, eventually, from any 
node to any other node worldwide) world sea-route model.  A workable model with 
decent fidelity in the Indian, Northern Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans, (where we can expect 
to operate) can be prepared in about one hour.  A much higher-resolution model of all the 
world’s navigable waters can be finished in several hours.  Only the former is necessary 
here.  
The movement of all ships in our model is deterministic.  The movement of each 
group is confined to planned routes similar to those prepared by a ship’s navigation team 
(see Figure 5).  Shuttle ships are free to move anywhere along a navigable world sea 
route that we create by combining our base network with the afloat group tracks.  If a 
node is not connected to another node by an arc, then a shuttle ship cannot travel directly 
between the two nodes.  Even though this requires us to build dense networks in key 
areas of operation, it prevents the shuttle ships from planning to travel over land.  The 
core model we implement is basically the same one used by Borden [2001], Givens 
[2002], and Cardillo [2004] but includes the necessary refinements for our scenario and 

















Figure 5. CSG, ESG, and MPG Scenario Tracks 
 
This is an illustration of our tracks of three CSGs, two ESGs, and one MPG to the area of 
operations off East Africa.  CSG 1 departs San Diego and transits the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans.  CSG 2 departs Norfolk and transits the Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and 
Indian Ocean.  CSG departs Singapore and transits the Indian Ocean.  ESG 1 departs 
Darwin, Australia and transits the Indian Ocean.  ESG 2 departs Naples, Italy and transits 
the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans.  MPG 1 departs Diego Garcia and transits the 
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III. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
We extend the decision support tool provided by Borden [2001], Givens [2002], 
and Cardillo [2004] embellishing the associated global sea-route network and resupply 
base model. We also develop an unclassified, realistic scenario involving the number and 
types of CLF ships required to sustain a foreseeable amount of deployed battle forces for 
that situation at sea. 
We also use OPNAV N42 official logistics planning factors [Futcher, 2004].  
Using these planning factors permits comparison with results from other CLF studies.  
Each group component of our scenario is given a daily position during transit, presence, 
and combat phases of deployment.   
By assuming that each ship in each group starts its deployment fully loaded, and 
then by deducting, for every group, on every day, a date-specific consumption of stores, 
ordnance, and fuel, we forecast daily commodity inventory levels and calculate any 
shortages when these levels fall below desired minimum percentages of total group 
capacities.  Based on these forecasted inventories, we know when a group requires a 
consolidation of cargo from the T-AKE and T-AO shuttle ships, and how much cargo it 
can receive.   
A. COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE 
Operationally, the CLF employs its ships in two ways.  For functional simplicity 
and most of our purposes in modeling the CLF, a CLF ship is categorized as either a 
station ship or shuttle ship.  Station ships are T-AOEs, and are part of a CSG.  Station 
ships receive fuel, stores, and ordnance from shuttle ships, and redistribute those 
commodities to the carrier and her escorts using both connected replenishment via 
standard Navy underway replenishment equipment and vertical replenishment from 
embarked helicopters that are used to transport stores to the decks of the customer ships.  
Shuttle ships have historically been single-product ships that transport supplies from 
forward logistics sites and deliver them to a station ship in the operational theater.  In 
textbook situations, the shuttle ship delivers as much (or all) of its cargo capacity as the 
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station ship can receive, which in turn stores and delivers its cargo to its combatant 
customers.   
Following OPNAV N42’s CLF transition plan, a relatively young T-AO 187 class 
of fleet oilers, and an even younger class of T-AOE 6 triple-product ships will be 
retained.  We use the data provided by Table 1 to assign CLF class characteristics to each 
of the CLF ships in our model.   
 
B. SEA BASING 
The Sea Base allows operations including the staging and rapid movement of land 
forces ashore.   
Sea Base: an inherently maneuverable, scalable aggregation of distributed, 
networked platforms and organizations – capable of receiving deploying 
forces and supporting deployment of those forces. [Clark, 2002] 
Seabasing: the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, 
reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, 
while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to 
select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the 
Joint Operating Area (JOA).  These capabilities expand operational 
maneuver options and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea. 
[Department of Defense, 2004] 
From the definitions, we deduce the importance of two items: access to bases, and 
the platforms of the sea base. Access can be limited by political decisions by states, such 
as the decision of Turkey to deny use of their seaports during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
Access can also be limited by to employment of enemy weapons, including weapons of 
mass destruction.  The ability to respond rapidly and in areas of limited access provides 
the genesis of expanded seabasing.  The sea base can project and support forces ashore in 
addition to its inherent strike capability.   
We concentrate our efforts on the assets to maintain the required fuel, ordnance, 
and dry cargo flow to the sea base in support of the forces operating from and within the 
sea base.  The sustainment of sea base-to-shore movement has been examined by other 
organizations such as OPNAV N70 (Warfare Integration And Assessment) and the 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command [Stewart, Futcher, Macht, 2005].  
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C. LOGISTICS PLANNING FACTORS 
In his seminal work on naval logistics, Eccles [1950, pg. 37] states: “All logistics 
planning is based on usage factors which are average figures computed in many various 
ways.”  Eccles’ factors have come to be called “logistic planning factors.”  These factors 
are tabulations that yield consumption rates as simple functions of platform type, number 
of personnel, and/or individual ship activity.  All planning factors are based on 
experience or usage data. 
Naval ships are designed and constructed with self-sufficiency at sea in mind.  
Commodities such as dry provisions will last for quite some time, and their usage rate 
does not change much from combat to peacetime operations.  It is practical to express the 
reciprocal of fuel and dry stores usage rates in terms of “days of supply,” rather than 
hours.  This offers a time fidelity that is easier for logistic planners to work with, and 
mimics the time-phased force deployment data for an entire operation plan.  Propulsion 
fuel must be replenished every few days, and its usage is a function of how a particular 
combatant ship is maneuvered.  Both fuel and ammunition are replenished as frequently 
as practical during combat.  Usage rates for aviation fuel and ordnance are difficult to 
determine because they are driven by the operational tempo, rather than just calendar 
days.   
Dry stores replenishment is usually considered the least demanding of the three 
major commodities, as long as a consistent source of supply is available.  Dry stores or 
DOD Class I (i.e., subsistence items) are of particular importance to us in our scenario.  
The humanitarian aid effort executed from day 37 until day 60 assumes the use of dry 
stores such as food and medical supplies.  We calculate usage rates for the humanitarian 
relief by multiplying the consumption numbers needed to support combat ashore from the 
Sea Base by four.  Historical information in this area is very difficult to find and depends 
greatly on the situation and the amount of U.S. Navy involvement.  Our numbers estimate 
supporting approximately 200,000 people (consuming 5.5 lbs. of food per day) for twenty 
four days. [Futcher, 2004]     
OPNAV N42 solicited much of the current and past data and studies available on 
fuel burn rates to arrive at reasonable figures for surge and sustainment phases of an 
operation for each ship type in Table 4.   
 
Table 4. Example of Logistics Planning Factors for Daily Usage [Futcher, 2004] 
 
As of July 2004, OPNAV N42’s collaborative work with many different agencies 
resulted in approval of a complete set of these planning factors.  See Cardillo [2004] for a 
discussion of the planning factors used here.  This important development allows 
decision makers to compare the results of very different planning efforts much more 
easily. 
D. CAPACITIES BY SHIP TYPE  
We treat each strike group and MPG as a single entity consisting of the capacities 
of all of its ships requiring support.  Each shuttle ship is also a single entity and the 
amount it can transfer is limited to the available station ship capacity within a CSG, and 
the cumulative capacities of the ships within an ESG or MPG.  The ship capacities used 
in our notional scenario are not the published capacities normally found in design 
specifications.  OPNAV N42’s transferable capacities for CLF ships and available 
combatant capacities were determined after reviewing multiple sources for modeling 
purposes and are standards for all CLF related models for the Navy (see Table 5).  The 
chosen transferable capacities consider many factors, such as ship stability, customer 
demand for specific products, damage and/or spoilage, safety from fuel spillage, and 
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weapon retrograde, all which limit the total cargo amount that can be delivered regardless 
of the gross capacities of the individual ships.   






















CG Cruiser - Guided Missile 15,032 475 68 94
CVN Carrier - Nuclear 0 74,642 1,710 1,765
DDG Destroyer - Guided Missile 10,518 475 55 48
DDX Destroyer - Next Generation 15,777 713 23 225
LHD Amphibious Assault Ship (Multi-Purpose) 42,976 9,952 520 391
LPD Amphibious Transport Dock  23,750 6,700 195 88
LSD Dock Landing Ship 19,150 1,144 140 38
MPF Maritime Preposition Fleet 29,000 28,000 500 750
T-AKE Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship 28,039 23,450 3,971 1,915
T-AO Oiler 109,059 64,880 0 0
T-AOE (X) Fast Combat Support Ship - Next Generation 120,000 61,230 1,111 2,593  
Table 5. CLF Ship Transferable and Combatant Ship Available Capacities  
 
These capacities have been determined from multiple sources and represent reasonable 
estimates for planning.  [Futcher, 2004] 
 
Even though the T-AKE has some fuel storage capacity and the T-AO has some 
stores capacity for emergencies, we do not feel these should be included in our planning 
model.  The T-AKE shuttle ship capacities we use for stores and ordnance are 
significantly skewed.  The capacities for these commodities on each T-AKE are 
potentially adjustable.  Our fixed amount favors the stores transfer capacity over 
ordnance by just over a two-to-one weight ratio.  We use these values because of the 

























Figure 6. Area of Operations for Scenario 
 
We develop a base scenario and three modified scenarios for evalu
CONOPs for CLF support of the Sea Base.  All of our scenarios are base
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intensity conflict followed by a humanitarian aid effort. This situation 
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All ship groups steam at best possible speed towards the crisis area of operations 
and are assigned the “surge consumption factor”.  The surge consumption factor takes 
into consideration the high fuel usage for maintaining increased speed.  The forces use 
the “peacetime consumption factor” after arrival to the operating area and before 
hostilities commence, representing the consolation of forces and preparation for combat 
operations.  Combat operations are high intensity for three days and then shift to combat 
sustainment levels for the next seven days.  Forces shift back to peacetime usage rates 
with elevated stores consumption representing the follow-on humanitarian operations.   
Our base scenario examines the number of CLF ships required to support forces 
that have a 50-percent reserve level.  The second scenario changes the reserve level to 60 
percent.  Our third scenario explores the use of a single fuel instead of using both DFM 
and JP-5.  We investigate changing the role of T-AOE CLF ships from station ships to 
shuttle ships in the forth scenario. 
1. Scenario 1: Base Scenario 
We assemble ships into CSGs, ESGs, MPG, and finally a Sea Base and then apply 
OPNAV N42 certified logistics planning factors over the duration of each operational 
phase.  Reserve levels for all commodities are set to 50 percent of total capacity (afloat 
group plus station ship capacities). 
A typical (CSGs 1 through 3) CSG in this study consists of a nuclear aircraft 
carrier (CVN), a T-AOE 6 or T-AOE(X) class station ship, one CG 47 Ticonderoga class 
cruiser, and two DDG 51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers.  Nuclear fast attack submarines 
that are a part of any type of strike group are considered self-sufficient and not modeled 
to receive CLF support.   
An ESG in our model is comprised of one LHD 1 Wasp class amphibious assault 
ship, a LPD 17 San Antonio class transport dock ship, one LSD 41 Whidbey Island class 
dock landing ship, a CG, one DDG, and one DD(X) class destroyer ship.   
A notional MPG consists of eight potentially different maritime prepositioning 
future ships and one supply ship serving as an afloat sustainment base for the group.  
“Best speed” is defined as the fastest speed of the slowest ship in the strike group; 
in this case, it is 26 knots as limited by the station ship for the CSG, and 20 knots as 
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limited by the amphibious ships for the ESG.  For the MPG ships, 12 knots is used as the 
transit speed from Diego Garcia to theater to allow for the fly-on assembly of MPG 
components prior to arrival.  In our scenario, a surge speed of 20 knots is used for the 
MPG.  We assume that an ESG and MPG will patrol their theaters at 12 knots for 
presence phase operations.  During major combat, the consumption rates of aviation fuel 
and ordnance are much higher as the aircraft fly a maximum number of sorties each day, 
and the CVN steams at 16 knots in the operating area, while the remaining CSG ships 
operate at their respective surge speeds.  For sustained combat, the CSG will patrol its 
area at 14 knots and expend ordnance and aviation fuel at sustainment rates.  
2. Scenario 2: 60 Percent Reserve Level 
This excursion explores the same phasing of ships as the base scenario while 
increasing the reserve levels of all customer ships to 60 percent.  We seek the number of 
CLF ships required to support the force here. 
3. Scenario 3: Single Fuel 
We examine the use of a single fuel taking the place of both DFM (NATO 
designator F-76) and JP-5 (NATO designator F-44).  The Navy is currently developing a 
single fuel for all its ships and aircraft, to reduce additional workload for carrying 
separate fuels.  Additionally this increases the operational flexibility.  The tankers (T-
AOs, T-AOEs, T-AOE(x)s) will no longer have to determine two fuel requirements for 
each customer.  This will allow for optimal use of a fuel load and avoid issues such as 
running out of JP-5 before DFM.  Consumption rates for fuel are increased 2% to 
represent a richer fuel mixture and higher burn rates for most conventionally-powered 
surface ships. 
4. Scenario 4: T-AOE Shuttle Ships 
This excursion examines using T-AOEs in a shuttle ship role instead of their 
normal role as a station ship.  The T-AOE class enjoys a ten-knot speed advantage over 
both the T-AKE and T-AO.  This means it can cover approximately 240 more nautical 
miles a day.   T-AOE fuel capacity is equivalent to the T-AO but the stores and 
ammunition capacity are 40% and 50%, respectively of those of the T-AKE.   
In practice, a station ship can function as a shuttle ship only while its CSG 
customer is transiting to the operational theater.  U.S. Central Command is a good 
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example of a combatant command that has a relatively small and easily-congested ocean 
theater.  Commander, Task Force 53 is often directed to assume operational control of an 
incoming station ship by ordering it to detach from its CSG.  The station ship then 
replenishes not only its former CSG customers, but also other U.S. Navy and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization ships present.  It may also function as a shuttle ship at 
times.  This is a common occurrence.  Immediately before Operation Iraqi Freedom 
began, the USS CAMDEN (AOE 2) was nearly eight months into a deployment, but was 
authorized to remain empty of commodities and function solely as a shuttle ship to 
service the five carrier battle groups in U.S. Central Command’s theater for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom’s 30-day campaign. [Morgan, 2003]   
This scenario removes the T-AOEs from the CSGs resulting in lower commodity 
capacities.  The T-AOEs are then used in the role of shuttle ships.  Our removal of the 
station ships results in the forces arriving to the operational area with decreased 
commodity levels.  We compensate for this by prepositioning CLF assets in the 
Mediterranean Sea and in Singapore.  The T-AKE and T-AO pair in both locations can 
top off the ships in transit.  Our additional support of the units in transit allow for the 
ships to arrive at approximately the same levels at the other three scenarios and allows us 
to compare the scenarios more thoroughly.   
F.  SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
In each of our scenarios, we attempt to find the most appropriate CLF level by 
choosing initial number of CLF ships, running the model with those CLF ships, and 
observe the utilizations and inventory levels that result.  If we find an “even trend” with 
low utilization we remove a CLF ship (red utilization).  If we find a “decreasing trend” 
with high utilization then we add a ship (declining inventory).  If we find an “even trend” 
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IV. RESULTS, AND INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RESULTS 
SCENARIO T-AKE T-AO T-AOE(X) TOTAL 
CLF 
1. 50% Reserve 3 4 - 7 
2. 60% Reserve 3 6 - 9 
3. Single Fuel 3 3 - 6 
4. T-AOE Shuttle Ships 2 2 2 6 
 
Table 6. Optimized CLF Shuttle Ship Numbers for each Scenario   
 
We discover interesting results with each scenario (see Table 6).  Scenario 1, is 
our base scenario, and establishes the number of CLF ships required to maintain support 
throughout. 
Scenario 2 explores the same factors as the base scenario with a 60 percent 
reserve levels instead of 50 percent.   
Scenario 3 looks at the effect of Navy using a single fuel instead of the two 
separate fuels it currently uses.  We combine the capacities of DFM and JP5 into one 
commodity for all ships.   
Scenario 4 examines changing the role of T-AOEs from station to shuttle ships.  
T-AOEs’ speed is approximately ten knots faster than either the T-AKE or the T-AO.  
This means it can support ships over a greater distance.  The T-AOE can use its speed 
advantage to cover the four thousand nautical mile round trip to Diego Garcia in 37% less 
time (8.1 days compared to 11.8 days, including two loading days). 
1. Base Scenario 
The optimization model for Scenario 1 has 32,305 constraints and 10,527 
variables, and solves in less than two minutes on a 2-MHz personal computer using 
GAMS [Brooke, Kendrick, Meeraus, Raman, 1998] with CPLEX solver [ILOG, 2003].  
We find that three T-AKE and four T-AO shuttle ships conducting 27 CONSOLs are 
required to support the force. 
CLF Ship Day Lat Long Customer DFM (kbbls) JP-5 (kbbls) Class I (Stons) Class V (Stons) DFM JP5 Class I Class V
tao04 d12 -6.8 63.9 ESG 1 91.7 1.3 0.0 0.0 84% 2% 0% 0%
tao02 d15 -3.17 42.21 ESG 2 109.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 100% 2% 0% 0%
take01 d15 -3.7 40.8 CSG 3 0.0 0.0 870.6 0.0 0% 0% 22% 0%
take02 d16 0.6 56.5 CSG 1 0.0 0.0 928.6 0.0 0% 0% 23% 0%
tao03 d16 0.6 56.5 CSG 1 83.2 48.3 0.0 0.0 76% 74% 0% 0%
take03 d16 -1.5 44.1 CSG 2 0.0 0.0 928.6 0.0 0% 0% 23% 0%
tao01 d16 -1.5 44.1 CSG 2 83.2 48.3 0.0 0.0 76% 74% 0% 0%
take01 d27 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 1728.0 0% 0% 100% 90%
tao02 d28 -3.7 40 Sea Base 109.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 100% 100% 0% 0%
tao04 d28 -3.7 40 Sea Base 109.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 100% 100% 0% 0%
take03 d29 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3186.6 1370.0 0% 0% 80% 72%
tao01 d29 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 109.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 100% 100% 0% 0%
take02 d31 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 835.8 1012.0 0% 0% 21% 53%
tao03 d31 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 109.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 100% 100% 0% 0%
take01 d40 -3.7 40 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 1915.6 0% 0% 100% 100%
tao02 d41 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 109.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 100% 100% 0% 0%
tao04 d41 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 109.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 100% 100% 0% 0%
tao01 d42 -3.7 40 Sea Base 109.0 64.8 0.0 0.0 100% 99% 0% 0%
take02 d43 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 614.4 0% 0% 100% 32%
tao03 d44 -3.7 40 Sea Base 99.5 20.5 0.0 0.0 91% 31% 0% 0%
take03 d49 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 0% 100% 0%
take01 d52 -3.7 40 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 0% 100% 0%
tao02 d54 -3.7 40 Sea Base 109.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 100% 100% 0% 0%
tao04 d54 -3.7 40 Sea Base 109.0 37.1 0.0 0.0 100% 57% 0% 0%
take02 d55 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 0% 100% 0%
tao01 d55 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 57.3 10.3 0.0 0.0 53% 16% 0% 0%
tao03 d59 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 100.1 41.0 0.0 0.0 92% 63% 0% 0%
Amounts Utilization Rates per CONSOL
 
Table 7. Scenario 1 CLF CONSOL Amounts and Utilization Data 
 
For example, tao03 CONSOLs with CSG 1 on day 16.  The utilization is 76 percent for 
DFM and 74 percent for JP-5 indicating a green utilization for DFM and yellow for JP-5. 
 
Both ESGs are replenished for fuel en route as shown in Table 7.  We expect this 
since ESGs do not have the additional inventory provided by a station ship.  On day 12 
ESG 1 is topped off with 91.7 kbbls of DFM and on day 15 ESG 2 is topped off with 109 
kbbls of DFM.  These en route replenishments are important and allow both ESGs to 
arrive to form the Sea Base at 76 and 92 percent inventory level for DFM.   
The MPG does not receive any fuel replenishment and arrives at the Sea Base 
with a 55-percent DFM inventory level.  The CSG 1 and 2 forces are topped off with fuel 
on day 16.   We observe in Figure 7 that the Sea Base begins with a 75-percent level for 
DFM.  The DFM level does decrease until it drops below the 50 percent reserve level on 
day 28.  After one day below the reserve level CONSOLs from tao2 and tao4 begin to 
increase DFM inventory.  The other Sea Base commodity inventory levels never 
30 
approach the 50-percent reserve level and are support with the CLF ship types and 
numbers. 
We observe the utilization of all CLF ships replenishing the Sea Base remains 
high throughout the scenario.  Together with the even trend indicated in Figure 7 from 
day 38 to the end, we can use our measures of effectiveness to support this as an optimal 
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Figure 7. Scenario 1 Sea Base Commodity Usage and Resupply Leve
 
 
2. 60 Percent Reserve Scenario  
The optimization model for Scenario 2 has 39,853 constraints and
variables, and solves in just over 2 minutes on a 2-MHz personal computer.  
AKE and six T-AO shuttle ships conducting 33 CONSOLs are required to sup
sustain the force at 60-percent reserve levels. 
We observe Scenario 3 exhibits more CONSOLs and requires more ships
other scenarios.  The increase of the reserve level to 60 percent stresses our a
deliver fuel more than our stores or ammunition replenishing capacity.  We a
three T-AKEs and observe that neither the stores nor ammunition inventor
approach the 60-percent reserve level during the entire scenario. 










Utilization for T-AOs supporting the Sea Base is very low (See Table 8).  Five out 
of the last six T-AO fuel CONSOLs are under 50-percent utilization.  The challenging 
task of keeping the forces above 60 percent at the beginning of the scenario sets the 
number of T-AOs high, resulting in extra capacity during the final week.     
CLF Ship Day Lat Long Customer DFM (kbbls) JP-5 (kbbls) Class I (Stons) Class V (Stons) DFM JP5 Class I Class V
take03 d09 33.65 21.95 CSG 1 0.0 0.0 522.4 0.0 0% 0% 13% 0%
tao04 d09 -8.9 81.2 CSG 1 68.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 63% 1% 0% 0%
tao05 d12 20.9 37.95 CSG 2 62.4 36.2 0.0 0.0 57% 55% 0% 0%
take02 d15 -3.7 40.8 CSG 2 0.0 0.0 870.6 0.0 0% 0% 22% 0%
tao02 d15 -4.4 47.3 ESG 1 45.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 42% 1% 0% 0%
tao06 d15 -3.17 42.21 ESG 1 109.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 100% 2% 0% 0%
take01 d16 0.6 56.5 ESG 2 0.0 0.0 928.6 0.0 0% 0% 23% 0%
tao01 d16 -3.7 40 CSG 3 57.7 48.6 0.0 0.0 53% 74% 0% 0%
tao03 d16 0.6 56.5 CSG 3 83.2 48.3 0.0 0.0 76% 74% 0% 0%
take03 d24 -3.7 40 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 0% 100% 0%
take02 d27 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 2757.1 1728.0 0% 0% 69% 90%
tao05 d27 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 109.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 100% 100% 0% 0%
tao04 d28 -3.7 40 Sea Base 109.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 100% 100% 0% 0%
tao06 d28 -3.7 40 Sea Base 109.0 60.8 0.0 0.0 100% 93% 0% 0%
tao02 d29 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 109.0 20.9 0.0 0.0 100% 32% 0% 0%
take01 d30 -3.7 40 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 1253.7 1876.0 0% 0% 32% 98%
tao03 d31 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 60.6 41.8 0.0 0.0 56% 64% 0% 0%
tao01 d33 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 42.3 41.8 0.0 0.0 39% 64% 0% 0%
take03 d36 -3.7 40 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 2507.4 1915.6 0% 0% 63% 100%
tao05 d40 -3.7 40 Sea Base 109.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 100% 100% 0% 0%
take01 d42 -3.7 40 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 1120.4 0% 0% 100% 59%
tao06 d42 -3.7 40 Sea Base 104.6 58.8 0.0 0.0 96% 90% 0% 0%
tao04 d44 -3.7 40 Sea Base 50.1 20.5 0.0 0.0 46% 31% 0% 0%
take02 d46 -3.7 40 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 0% 100% 0%
tao01 d48 -3.7 40 Sea Base 100.1 41.0 0.0 0.0 92% 63% 0% 0%
take03 d50 -3.7 40 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 0% 100% 0%
tao03 d50 -3.7 40 Sea Base 50.1 20.5 0.0 0.0 46% 31% 0% 0%
tao02 d51 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 25.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 23% 16% 0% 0%
tao05 d53 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 50.1 20.5 0.0 0.0 46% 31% 0% 0%
take01 d55 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 0% 100% 0%
tao06 d55 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 50.1 20.5 0.0 0.0 46% 31% 0% 0%
tao04 d57 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 50.1 20.5 0.0 0.0 46% 31% 0% 0%
take02 d58 -3.7 40 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 0% 100% 0%
Amounts Utilization Rates per CONSOL
  
Table 8. Scenario 2 CLF CONSOL Amounts and Utilization Data 
  
 Our inventory levels in stores and ammunition show increased fluctuation 
compared to maintaining the level at 50-percent reserve.  The three T-AKEs are able to 
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Figure 8. Scenario 2 Sea Base Commodity Usage and R
 
3. Single-Fuel Scenario   
The optimization model for Scenario 3 has 40,612 co
variables, and solves in just under 2 minutes.  Three T-AKE and thr
are required to conduct 24 CONSOLs.   
All CONSOLs prior to the formation of the Sea Base occur 
Table 9).  This is the latest date of a first CONSOL among all 










nstraints and 11,886 
ee T-AO shuttle ships 
on day 15 and 16 (see 
our scenarios.  Three 
CLF Ship Day Lat Long Customer Single Fuel (kbbls) Class I (Stons) Class V (Stons) SF Class I Class V
take02 d15 -3.7 40.8 CSG 1 0.0 881.1 0.0 0% 22% 0%
tao03 d15 -3.17 42.21 CSG 2 118.6 0.0 0.0 68% 0% 0%
take01 d16 0.6 56.5 CSG 2 0.0 939.8 0.0 0% 24% 0%
take03 d16 -1.5 44.1 ESG 1 0.0 939.8 0.0 0% 24% 0%
tao01 d16 -3.7 41.4 ESG 2 126.5 0.0 0.0 73% 0% 0%
tao02 d16 -1.5 44.1 CSG 3 134.1 0.0 0.0 77% 0% 0%
take02 d27 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 3971.4 1728.0 0% 100% 90%
tao03 d28 -3.7 40 Sea Base 174.4 0.0 0.0 100% 0% 0%
take03 d29 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 3160.0 1370.0 0% 80% 72%
tao01 d29 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 174.4 0.0 0.0 100% 0% 0%
tao02 d29 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 174.4 0.0 0.0 100% 0% 0%
take01 d30 -3.7 40 Sea Base 0.0 415.8 506.0 0% 10% 26%
take02 d39 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 3971.4 1915.6 0% 100% 100%
tao03 d41 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 174.4 0.0 0.0 100% 0% 0%
tao01 d42 -3.7 40 Sea Base 174.4 0.0 0.0 100% 0% 0%
tao02 d42 -3.7 40 Sea Base 174.4 0.0 0.0 100% 0% 0%
take01 d44 -3.7 40 Sea Base 0.0 3971.4 1120.4 0% 100% 59%
take03 d45 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 3118.3 0.0 0% 79% 0%
take02 d51 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 100% 0%
tao03 d54 -3.7 40 Sea Base 174.4 0.0 0.0 100% 0% 0%
tao01 d55 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 174.4 0.0 0.0 100% 0% 0%
tao02 d55 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 174.4 0.0 0.0 100% 0% 0%
take01 d56 -3.7 40 Sea Base 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 100% 0%
take03 d57 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 3478.9 0.0 0% 88% 0%
Amounts Utilization Rates per CONSOL
 
Table 9. Scenario 3 CLF CONSOL Amounts and Utilization Data 
 
The Sea Base begins with a 75-percent DFM level, as seen in Figure 9, that 
decreases to the 50-percent reserve level by day 27.  Starting at day 28 the DFM 
commodity level is maintained at an even trend by the available T-AO force. 
   The stores and ammunition levels maintain the same level as Scenario 1.  We 
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Figure 9. Scenario 3 Sea Base Commodity Usage and Resupply Levels 
 
4. T-AOE Shuttle Ship Scenario 
The integer linear program for Scenario 4 has 27,443 constraints and 9,713 
variables, and solves in just over 5 minutes.  Two T-AKE, two T-AO, and two T-AOE 
shuttle ships conduct 26 CONSOLs to support and sustain the forces. 
We observe (see Table 10) the earliest CONSOLs among any of our scenarios on 
day 8.  The model uses the speed advantage of the T-AOE to CONSOL with CSG 1 and 
top off all commodities.   
35 
CLF Ship Day Lat Long Customer DFM (kbbls) JP-5 (kbbls) Class I (Stons) Class V (Stons) DFM JP5 Class I Class V
taoe01 d08 37.22 12.75 CSG 1 21.0 24.1 460.3 0.0 18% 39% 41% 0%
tao01 d09 6.2 109.7 CSG 1 23.7 27.1 0.0 0.0 22% 41% 0% 0%
taoe02 d12 -3.7 40 CSG 1 25.4 36.3 690.5 0.0 21% 59% 62% 0%
tao02 d15 -4.4 47.3 CSG 2 109.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 100% 2% 0% 0%
take01 d16 0.6 56.5 ESG 1 0.0 0.0 920.6 0.0 0% 0% 23% 0%
take02 d16 0.6 56.5 CSG 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0%
taoe01 d18 -3.7 40 Sea Base 120.0 61.2 1111.0 0.0 100% 100% 100% 0%
taoe02 d21 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 120.0 54.2 1111.0 0.0 100% 89% 100% 0%
taoe01 d27 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 120.0 61.2 1111.0 1728.0 100% 100% 100% 67%
tao02 d29 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 109.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 100% 100% 0% 0%
taoe02 d30 -3.7 40 Sea Base 118.5 38.2 1111.0 1876.0 99% 62% 100% 72%
take02 d33 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 1518.0 0% 0% 100% 79%
tao01 d34 -3.7 40 Sea Base 77.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 71% 100% 0% 0%
taoe01 d37 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 61.6 61.2 1111.0 1518.0 51% 100% 100% 59%
taoe02 d39 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 46.2 29.5 1111.0 0.0 39% 48% 100% 0%
take01 d41 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 0% 100% 0%
take02 d45 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 0% 100% 0%
tao02 d46 -3.7 40 Sea Base 109.0 65.4 0.0 0.0 100% 100% 0% 0%
taoe01 d46 -3.7 40 Sea Base 52.8 6.3 1111.0 0.0 44% 10% 100% 0%
taoe02 d48 -3.7 40 Sea Base 46.2 20.5 1111.0 0.0 39% 33% 100% 0%
take01 d53 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3971.4 0.0 0% 0% 100% 0%
tao01 d54 -3.7 40 Sea Base 109.0 61.5 0.0 0.0 100% 94% 0% 0%
taoe01 d55 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 52.8 10.3 1111.0 0.0 44% 17% 100% 0%
take02 d57 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 0.0 0.0 3653.7 0.0 0% 0% 92% 0%
taoe02 d57 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 46.2 20.5 1111.0 0.0 39% 33% 100% 0%
tao02 d59 -3.7 40.8 Sea Base 46.2 20.5 0.0 0.0 42% 31% 0% 0%
Amounts Utilization Rates per CONSOL
 
Table 10. Scenario 4 CLF CONSOL Amounts and Utilization Data 
 
We find that without the additional capacity of the station ships, the Sea Base is 
formed with 47 percent (which is below the 50-percent reserve level).  This is a 
temporary situation, and by day 31 the Sea Base is replenished to the 100-percent level 
for DFM.  The ability to carry all four commodities is utilized three times by T-AOEs on 
day 27, day 30, and day 37.  The utilization for the commodities transferred during these 
CONSOLs is very high.  We see one-hundred percent utilization of stores for all ten 
CONSOLs between T-AOEs and the Sea Base.   
The reduced stores capacity in the T-AOE class causes a larger drop in the stores 
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Figure 10. Scenario 4 Sea Base Commodity Usage and Resupply L
 
B. INSIGHTS 
Configuration of the T-AKE to carry more stores than ammunitio
support the follow-on humanitarian aid effort in our scenario.  The ammuniti
of the station ship and that provided by the T-AKEs is sufficient considering 
with ten days of total combat.  The humanitarian aid effort is much more
challenging to support at the range of the forward logistics site in this scenari
The implementation of a Navy single fuel reduces both the number of
and CONSOLs needed to support forces in that scenario. 
Changing the role of T-AOEs from station to shuttle ship can reduce
number of total ships to support forces in our scenario.  The cost for th
providing continuous support to the forces during the transit to the area o
Assigning T-AOEs as station ships and then reassigning them to the shut
upon arrival in a area of operations is a concept warranting further research.  
C. CONCLUSIONS 
We have demonstrated the use of a prescriptive optimization model f
CLF.  This model can be used to analyze almost any conceivable scenar
naval assets, under a variety of proposed CONOPS. 
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We have illustrated our model with a 60-day seabasing scenario involving a ramp-
up to combat, Sea Base formation, and transition to a logistically demanding 
humanitarian assistance mission. 
D. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
As new classes of ships become available to MSC, each can be added to the 
model to determine its viability as a CLF shuttle ship or station ship.  The new high speed 
logistics ships are an obvious class to incorporate, once their planning factors become 
more specifically defined. 
The addition of the ability to perform multiple CONSOLs on one trip would allow 
a more accurate assessment of utilization, but we conjecture that this will become a 
concern only with future fast, high capacity ships, as we achieve very good utilization 
numbers with our current CLF ships. 
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APPENDIX 
A. CLF MODEL FORMULATION 
1. Indices 
s              Shuttle ship (~21)  
v(s)    Shuttle ship class (e.g., T-AKE,  T-AO)  
p    Port available to load shuttle ships (~18)  
ag    Afloat group (~10) (alias ag’)    
d=1,…,D    Day (D ~ 70) (alias d’)  
c    Commodity (DFM, JP5, STOR, ORDN)  
2. Given Data 
speedv   Speed of shuttle ship class v (nm/day)  
portok4vp,v   =1 if port p can accommodate shuttle ship class v, 0 otherwise  
inptTAT    Time in port to resupply and turn around a shuttle ship (days)  
legdaysv,ag,d,p   Shuttle ship class v transit time from afloat group ag position on  
day d to port p following given sea routes and/or afloat group 
tracks (days)  
useAGag,d,c   Consumption by afloat group ag during day d of commodity c (c- 
         units)   
mxloadag,c   Maximum capacity of afloat group ag to carry commodity c (c-
units)  
safetyc,ag   Minimum desired fraction of mxloadag,c to be held at all times  
canhitagag,d    Logical indicator if afloat group ag can CONSOL on day d   
scanhitags,ag   Logical indicator if shuttle ship s can HIT ag   
capacitys,c   Shuttle ship s capacity to deliver commodity c (c-units)  
penaltyc    Penalty per deficit unit of desired storage held by afloat group 
(penalty per c-unit)  
negpenc    Penalty per negative unit of storage held (penalty per c-unit)  
 
3. Derived Data 
hitOKs,ag,d  Binary indicator enabling shuttle ship s to CONSOL ag on day d, 
defined as canhitagag,d ^ scanhitags,ag.   
canhitagag,d argument derives from maneuvering and/or operating restrictions on 
ag during day d, (e.g., canal passage precludes a CONSOL) while scanhitags,ag can 
restrict shuttle ships to CONSOL only a subset of afloat groups, and in the extreme case 
even assigning s exclusively to a single ag.   
cycledaysv,ag,d,ag’,d’  If a shuttle ship of class v departs afloat group ag on day d to 
reload at some port p, the minimum number of days before a CONSOL with afloat group 
ag’ on day d’ is  
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p v ag d p ag d p
v ag d p v ag d pp portok v d legdays inptTAT legdays
legdays inptTAT legdays= ≥ + +
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤∞ +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭  
Note that this admits a cycle with slack time (or, “shuttle ship waiting time”) d’-d-
cycledaysv,ag,d,ag’,d≥0, and that, because of the relative motion of a shuttle ship and an 
Afloat Group over navigable sea routes, and their daily proximity to ports and to each 
other, there will be cases in which planning for a shuttle ship to wait for this amount of 
time is more efficient and realistic than restricting plans to have no such slack.  
4. Decision Variables 
HITs,ag,d    Binary indicator of shuttle ship s CONSOL visit to afloat 
group ag on day d  
CONSOLs,ag,d,c  Shuttle ship s delivery to afloat group ag on day d of    
                         commodity c (c-units)  
SHORTAGEag,d,c   afloat group ag, at end of day d, has this deficiency below  
      safetyc (c-units)  
NEGINVag,d,c   Afloat group ag, at end of day d, has this deficiency below 
zero (c- units)  
5. Formulation 
s.t.   
mxloadag,c 
                        
, ,
, , , , ,
| s ag dp
s ag dp c ag dp c
dp d hitOK dp d
CONSOL useAG
≤ ≤
+ −∑ ∑  
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     ,csafety mxload≥ ag c , ,ag d c∀   (2)  
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6. Discussion 
Inequalities (1) limit daily, afloat group commodity levels to their available 
capacities.  We assume at the beginning of our notional scenario, each afloat group is full 
to capacity with every commodity.  Thereafter, the stores state is computed as the initial 
load plus all CONSOL quantities, less all consumption quantities, for a particular day.  
Inequalities (2) similarly limit minimum commodity levels to a desired safety stock 
margin, account for any shortages below this safety stock, and optionally, will account 
for negative commodity levels while waiting for a CONSOL event to occur.  Inequalities 
(3) limit underway replenishment quantities to be zero unless a CONSOL event occurs, in 
which case the transferred quantities cannot exceed the maximum conveyable capacity of 
either the shuttle or customer ships.  Constraints (4) restrict successive shuttle ship 
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CONSOLs with more than one afloat group from occurring, until sufficient time is 
allowed for the CLF ship to cycle through a port for resupply.  Constraints (5) stipulate 
that shuttle ship consolidation visits are binary.  Simple bounds (6)-(9) restrict 
commodity volumes to be non-negative and finite.  The objective function (10) rewards 
maximum shuttle ship CONSOL volumes, penalizes any deficiencies below desired 
safety stocks, and heavily penalizes any shortages below zero inventories, in an effort to 
encourage the most efficient scheduling of all shuttle ship CONSOL events [Cardillo, 
2004]. 
 
B. SEA ROUTES MODEL NODE LIST 
Node ID LAT LONG Name Node ID LAT LONG Name Node ID LAT LONG Name
ADEN 12.8 45.0 Aden GUAM 13.5 144.6 Guam PAC4 30.8 160.8 mid-Pacific waypt4
ADR 42.5 16.0 Adriatic Sea HANM 34.0 131.0 Hanmon Straits PANA 8.9 -79.6 Panama, Atlantic
AQA 29.5 35.0 Aqaba Jordan HI 21.4 -158.2 Hawaii PANP 9.4 -79.9 Panama, Pacific
ARA 20.0 60.0 Arabian Sea HOA 3.5 49.2 Horn of Africa PER -32.0 115.8 Perth, Australia
AUG 37.2 15.2 Augusta Bay IT HOPE -37.8 17.7 Cape of Good Hope PG1 26.5 55.5 Per Gulf waypt1
AUS1 -26.5 160.5 Australia 1 HOR 26.6 56.3 Strait of Hormuz PG2 26.3 51.5 Per Gulf waypt2
AUS2 -45.1 147.2 Australia 2 HORN -57.4 -68.5 Cape Horn PI 15.0 121.0 Philippines
AUS3 -35.7 112.6 Australia 3 IWA 33.9 132.1 Iwakuni JP REDN 28.3 34.5 Red Sea north
AUS4 -14.0 106.5 Australia 4 JAPN 34.5 139.7 Japan North RED1 27.0 34.5 Red Sea 1
AUS5 -6.8 119.5 Australia 5 JAPS 31.8 133.4 Japan South REDM 20.0 38.5 Red Sea middle
BAH 26.2 50.6 Bahrain JEB 25.0 55.1 Jebel Ali ROTA 36.6 -6.4 Rota SP
CHEJ 34.0 125.5 Cheju Strait JED 21.5 39.1 Jeddah SAS 33.2 129.7 Sasebo JP
DARW -12.9 130.5 Darwin, Australia KORS 34.0 129.0 Korean Strait SATL -7.0 -18.2 South Atlantic
DIEG -7.3 72.4 Diego Garcia LANT1 36.6 -56.1 mid-Atl waypt1 SCHI 10.0 113.0 South China Sea
EAF -3.7 40.3 East African Coast LANT2 36.3 -36.0 mid-Atl waypt2 SDCA 32.7 -117.2 San Diego CA
ECHS 32.0 126.0 E China Sea LANT3 36.1 -15.8 mid-Atl waypt3 SING 1.3 103.8 Singapore
ELANT 41.0 -14.0 East Atlantic MAL 2.5 101.7 Str of Malacca SIO -24.1 57.9 South IO
EPAC 15.0 -110.0 East Pacific MALE 6.3 73.0 Male Maldives SEJ 40.0 129.5 Japan, Sea
FUJ 25.2 56.4 Al Fujayrah UAE MAN 12.7 43.3 Bab el Mandeb SOJ 34.5 130.0 Sea of Japan
GA1 12.0 43.5 Aden, Gulf waypt1 MED1 38.3 8.0 Med waypt1 SOO 40.0 19.0 Strait of Otranto
GA2 12.5 48.0 Aden, Gulf waypt2 MED2 36.2 16.0 Med waypt2 SOU 35.5 24.2 Souda Bay, Crete
GB 42.5 -50.0 Grand Banks MED3 36.0 20.0 Med waypt3 SYDN -33.9 151.2 Sydney, Australia
GEO 5.4 100.3 G'town Malaysia MED4 35.5 26.0 Med waypt4 SUEZN 31.3 32.3 Suez Canal, North
GIB 36.0 -5.8 Str of Gibraltar NOR 60.3 5.2 Norway fjiord SUEZS 29.9 32.6 Suez Canal, South
GOA 29.0 34.8 Gulf of Aqaba NVA 36.9 -76.3 Norfolk VA WIND 20.0 -73.8 Windward Passage
GOO 23.0 61.0 Gulf of Oman PAC1 32.2 -137.7 mid-Pacific waypt1 OKIN 30.0 130.0 Okinawa, Japan
GOS 28.8 33.0 Gulf of Suez PAC2 31.7 -158.2 mid-Pacific waypt2 YELL 35.0 124.0 Yellow Sea




C. SEA ROUTES MODEL ARC LIST 
1. Fast Arc List 
Aden Aden, Gulf waypt2 Str of Gibraltar Okinawa, Japan Norfolk VA Yellow Sea
Aden Aden, Gulf waypt1 Gulf of Aqaba Red Sea north mid-Pacific waypt1 Sasebo JP
Aqaba Jordan Red Sea north Gulf of Oman Male Maldives mid-Pacific waypt1 San Diego CA
Augusta Bay IT Med waypt2 Gulf of Oman Arabian Sea mid-Pacific waypt1 Norfolk VA
Augusta Bay IT Strait of Otranto Gulf of Oman Strait of Hormuz mid-Pacific waypt2 Sasebo JP
Augusta Bay IT Souda Bay, Crete Gulf of Suez Philippines mid-Pacific waypt2 San Diego CA
Augusta Bay IT Suez Canal, North Gulf of Suez Okinawa, Japan mid-Pacific waypt2 Norfolk VA
Australia 1 mid-Pacific waypt4 Guam mid-Pacific waypt4 mid-Pacific waypt3 Sasebo JP
Australia 1 Hawaii Guam Hawaii mid-Pacific waypt3 San Diego CA
Australia 1 Okinawa, Japan Guam Japan South mid-Pacific waypt3 Norfolk VA
Australia 2 Australia 1 Guam East Pacific mid-Pacific waypt4 Sasebo JP
Australia 2 Okinawa, Japan Guam South China Sea mid-Pacific waypt4 San Diego CA
Australia 2 Australia 3 Guam Australia 1 mid-Pacific waypt4 Norfolk VA
Australia 3 Perth, Australia Guam Australia 5 Panama, Atlantic Okinawa, Japan
Australia 3 Australia 4 Hanmon Straits Iwakuni JP Per Gulf waypt1 Per Gulf waypt2
Australia 4 Perth, Australia Hanmon Straits Korean Strait Per Gulf waypt2 Bahrain
Australia 4 Darwin, Australia Hanmon Straits Sea of Japan Philippines E China Sea
Australia 4 Australia 5 Hawaii mid-Pacific waypt1 Philippines Sasebo JP
Australia 5 Darwin, Australia Hawaii mid-Pacific waypt2 Philippines San Diego CA
Cheju Strait Yellow Sea Hawaii mid-Pacific waypt3 Philippines Japan, Sea
Diego Garcia Male Maldives Hawaii mid-Pacific waypt4 Philippines Norfolk VA
Diego Garcia Australia 3 Hawaii Panama, Pacific Philippines Philippines
Diego Garcia Australia 4 Hawaii Philippines Philippines Jebel Ali
East African Coast Horn of Africa Hawaii Sasebo JP Philippines Bab el Mandeb
East African Coast Diego Garcia Hawaii San Diego CA Red Sea north Philippines
E China Sea Cheju Strait Hawaii Norfolk VA Rota SP Okinawa, Japan
E China Sea Yellow Sea Horn of Africa Arabian Sea Sasebo JP Cheju Strait
E China Sea Sasebo JP Horn of Africa Diego Garcia Sasebo JP Korean Strait
E China Sea Korean Strait Horn of Africa Male Maldives Sasebo JP Japan, Sea
East Atlantic Str of Gibraltar Cape of Good Hope South Atlantic Sasebo JP Norfolk VA
East Atlantic Grand Banks Cape of Good Hope Japan, Sea South Atlantic Okinawa, Japan
East Atlantic Norfolk VA Cape of Good Hope Australia 3 South Atlantic mid-Atl waypt1
East Atlantic Rota SP Cape Horn Hawaii South Atlantic mid-Atl waypt3
East Atlantic Okinawa, Japan Cape Horn mid-Pacific waypt1 South Atlantic Norfolk VA
East Pacific Japan South Cape Horn San Diego CA San Diego CA Norfolk VA
East Pacific Hawaii Cape Horn South Atlantic Japan, Sea South China Sea
East Pacific Guam Cape Horn Cape of Good Hope Japan, Sea Australia 5
East Pacific Philippines Iwakuni JP Japan South Japan, Sea Horn of Africa
East Pacific San Diego CA Japan North Hawaii Japan, Sea Diego Garcia
East Pacific Sasebo JP Japan North Philippines Japan, Sea Australia 4
East Pacific Norfolk VA Japan North Japan South Japan, Sea Australia 3
East Pacific Adriatic Sea Japan North South China Sea Japan, Sea Arabian Sea
Aden, Gulf waypt1 Aden, Gulf waypt2 Japan North San Diego CA Sea of Japan Japan, Sea
Aden, Gulf waypt2 Arabian Sea Japan North Norfolk VA Strait of Otranto Adriatic Sea
Grand Banks Str of Gibraltar Jebel Ali Per Gulf waypt1 Strait of Otranto Med waypt2
Grand Banks Norfolk VA Korean Strait Sea of Japan Strait of Otranto Med waypt3
Grand Banks Rota SP Med waypt1 Med waypt2 Souda Bay, Crete Strait of Otranto
Grand Banks Okinawa, Japan Med waypt1 Str of Gibraltar Souda Bay, Crete Med waypt2
Grand Banks Norway fjiord Med waypt2 Suez Canal, North Souda Bay, Crete Med waypt3
G'town Malaysia Male Maldives Med waypt3 Suez Canal, North Yokosuka JP Japan North
G'town Malaysia Adriatic Sea Med waypt3 Souda Bay, Crete
Str of Gibraltar Norfolk VA Norfolk VA Rota SP
Str of Gibraltar Rota SP Norfolk VA Okinawa, Japan  
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2. Slow Arcs 
From To Delay
Aqaba Jordan Gulf of Aqaba 0.25
Al Fujayrah UAE Strait of Hormuz 0.25
Aden, Gulf waypt1 Bab el Mandeb 0.25
Gulf of Oman Strait of Hormuz 0.25
Gulf of Suez Okinawa, Japan 0.25
Strait of Hormuz Jebel Ali 0.25
Strait of Hormuz Per Gulf waypt1 0.25
Str of Malacca Japan, Sea 0.25
Panama, Atlantic Panama, Pacific 1.00
Suez Canal, North Okinawa, Japan 1.00  
Delay in days 
 
D. CSG, ESG, AND MPG ROUTES 
 
LAT LONG LAT LONG LAT LONG LAT LONG LAT LONG LAT LONG
ESG 2 MPG 1CSG 1 CSG 2 CSG 3 ESG 1
Day 01 19.9 -170.6 36.9 -76.3 -13.9 126.2 40.7 14.0 -7.3 72.4 0.6 105.1
Day 02 16.1 178.2 39.3 -63.2 -13.9 119.5 36.8 16.6 -6.1 64.0 2.7 100.5
Day 03 15.3 171.7 40.5 -50.1 -13.5 114.3 34.5 23.0 -5.5 55.2 7.2 96.7
Day 04 13.9 161.2 39.9 -36.2 -12.8 109.9 32.6 29.6 -4.5 46.6 5.8 86.4
Day 05 11.6 150.5 38.1 -23.4 -11.8 103.3 31.8 32.4 -3.7 40.0 4.8 75.9
Day 06 8.3 140.0 36.0 -10.4 -11.4 98.1 29.9 32.6 -3.7 40.8 2.7 66.4
Day 07 5.8 129.4 37.2 2.7 -11.4 92.1 24.7 35.6 -3.7 40.0 0.6 56.5
Day 08 5.8 119.2 37.2 12.8 -10.7 86.8 20.0 39.1 -3.7 40.8 -1.6 47.8
Day 09 6.2 109.7 33.7 22.0 -8.9 81.2 15.0 42.1 -3.7 40.0 -3.7 40.0
Day 10 0.6 105.1 31.3 32.3 -8.2 74.8 11.3 44.4 -3.7 40.8 -3.7 40.8
Day 11 2.7 100.5 29.9 32.6 -7.5 69.5 12.5 50.2 -3.7 40.0 -3.7 40.0
Day 12 7.2 96.7 20.9 38.0 -6.8 63.9 9.8 53.4 -3.7 40.8 -3.7 40.8
Day 13 5.8 86.4 11.4 44.5 -5.8 57.9 4.7 50.7 -3.7 40.0 -3.7 40.0
Day 14 4.8 75.9 14.1 54.9 -5.1 52.6 -0.3 47.0 -3.7 40.8 -3.7 40.8
Day 15 2.7 66.4 4.0 52.0 -4.4 47.3 -3.2 42.2 -3.7 40.0 -3.7 40.0
Day 16 0.6 56.5 -1.5 44.1 -3.7 41.4 -3.7 40.2 -3.7 40.8 -3.7 40.8  
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